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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of dividend policy in Malaysian 
financial institutions. Panel data set were constructed from 33 financial institutions in 
Malaysia for a period of 10 years (2001-2010). The results show a statistically significant 
positive relationship between dividend policy and profitability, which implies that 
Malaysian financial institutions distribute higher dividends when they record higher 
profitability. Lagged dividend also shows a positive significant relationship with dividend 
policy, which implies that financial institutions in Malaysia follow a stable dividend policy 
that maintains regularity of dividend payments with gradual adjustments of dividend 
payments towards the target payout. On the other hand, leverage shows a significant 
negative relationship with dividend policy, which means that a riskier financial institution 
pays out lower dividends. In conclusion, profitability, lagged dividend and leverage are 
found to be the major determinants of dividend policy in relation to Malaysian financial 
institutions. The results support the agency cost theory, signaling theory and the free cash 
flow hypothesis.
JEL Classification: G35, G21
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INTRODUCTION
Black (1976) states in his study that, “the 
harder we look at dividend, the more it 
seems like a puzzle with pieces that just 
don’t fit together.” Until today, the dividend 
payout decision has always been a subject of 
interest to financial analysts, academicians 
and researchers as they are interested in 
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studying the extent to which the earnings of a 
company are distributed in dividends among 
shareholders or retained for future growth of 
the company. There are different arguments 
with regards to dividends in finance-related 
literature. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
first raised the issue on dividend policy, 
arguing that in a perfect capital market, the 
dividend decision is irrelevant as it does 
not affect the value of the firm. However, 
this argument is opposed by financial 
practitioners as well as academicians due 
to the existence of market imperfections 
such as differential tax rates, information 
asymmetries, conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders, transaction 
costs, flotation costs and irrational investor 
behaviour. Shiller (1984) observes that 
investor behaviour is largely affected by 
societal norms and attitudes. Furthermore, 
errors in judgement and trading activities by 
shareholders cannot be logically explained 
due to social pressures. On the other hand, 
Michel (1979) reports a systematic relation 
between industry type and dividend policy. 
This shows that the actions of executives 
of competitive firms do influence the 
determination of dividend payout levels 
made by managers. 
Companies pay dividends for three 
common reasons: taxation, asymmetric 
information and agency costs. In terms 
of taxation, investors may prefer stocks 
that have low dividend payouts if they 
have favourable tax treatment. This is 
supported by Brennan (1970), who found 
that higher pretax risk adjusted returns 
on stocks with higher dividend yields 
are required to compensate for the tax 
disadvantages of these returns. Furthermore, 
managers choose to increase the level 
of dividends as an indication of indirect 
confidential information to investors such 
as in a situation where they believe that the 
current market value of their firm’s stock 
is lower than its intrinsic value. Thus, the 
result of the dividend-signaling hypothesis 
is that firms that increase/decrease 
dividends will experience increasing/
decreasing share prices (Bhattacharya, 
1979). Agency relationship between 
managers and shareholders of the firm 
is also one of the causes why firms pay 
dividends. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that 
in order to lessen the agency costs between 
shareholders and managers, firms pay 
dividends. If the firm pays dividends, they 
can opt to raise money through the capital 
market. However, they will be subject 
to the scrutiny and disciplining effect of 
investment professionals. Thus, in exchange 
for the increased monitoring, shareholders 
are willing to accept higher personal taxes 
associated with dividends. 
The dividend decision reflects the 
market value of the firm, for there will 
be less availability of internal funds 
for expansion purposes of the firm as a 
direct consequence of dividend payments. 
Therefore, in deciding on dividend payment, 
there is a dilemma in balancing between 
the shareholder’s expectation and the 
firm’s long-term interest. Since Miller and 
Modigliani’s study, many other studies have 
been conducted to identify how dividend 
affects the firm’s value as well as how 
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dividend policy should be formulated by 
managers. In practice, different dividend 
payment models are used such as residual 
dividend policy, constant growth dividend 
policy, constant dividend payout ratio, 
low stable dividend and premium payout 
policy at the end of the year. These policies 
are normally chosen based on the size and 
profitability of the company. (Alekneviciene 
et al., 2006). 
 There are many factors that are seen 
to have an effect on the dividend decision. 
These factors may differ from country to 
country as well as from industry to industry. 
However, there has been little attention 
given to financial institutions in relation 
to the study on dividend policy. Financial 
institutions are normally excluded from the 
samples in studies of firms’ decision policy 
due to their characteristics of high leverage, 
tight regulation, capital structure and asset 
opaqueness. For example, the Malaysian 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
1989 (BAFIA) requires that every licensed 
institution apply in writing for the Central 
Bank’s approval with respect to the amount 
of dividend proposed for declaration. The 
Central Bank may approve the same, or a 
reduced amount, or even prohibit payment 
of any dividends, depending on the financial 
condition of the institution.  
 Previously, the financial sector 
was just an enabler of growth; however, 
it has morphed from being an enabler to 
a vital source of economic growth. The 
Malaysian financial sector has encountered 
significant transformation, together with 
reinvention. As a result of the restructuring, 
consolidation and rationalisation efforts 
that were undertaken in the banking sector, 
the Malaysian financial sector now rests 
on a stronger foundation. Furthermore, 
progressive deregulation and liberalisation 
have contributed to the increasing flexibility 
of financial institutions as well as created 
new business opportunities and increased 
competition. 
 This study aims to identify the 
determinants of dividend policy in Malaysian 
financial institutions. Even though there is 
an enormous volume of studies conducted 
on issues related to determinants of dividend 
policy, these studies have mainly focused 
on developed countries, and the conclusion 
reached may not be applicable in countries 
with different corporate cultures and 
economic frameworks. Furthermore, very 
little attention has been given to financial 
institutions in relation to study into dividend 
policy.  The rest of this paper is organised 
as follows: the next section provides a 
review of related studies in a literature 
review. The third section outlines the 
data and methodology. The fourth section 
discusses the results, and finally, the article 
is concluded in the fifth section.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Ross et al. (2008) define dividends as cash 
that is paid out arising from current or 
accumulated current earnings. This payment 
is divided among shareholders out of the 
cash surplus from their net income for the 
year, depending on management’s decision 
to retain it for re-investment purposes or to 
pay out as dividends. 
S. Hutagalung, M. H. Yahya, F. Kamarudin and Z. Osman
130 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 127 - 148 (2013)
Tax-adjusted models conclude that 
investors require higher expected returns 
for shares of dividend paying stocks. Due to 
the imposition of tax liability on dividends, 
dividend payment needs to be grossed up 
in order to enhance the shareholder’s pre-
tax returns. Masulis and Trueman (1988) 
view cash dividend payments as deferred 
dividend costs. They predict that investors 
differ in their ideal firm investment or 
dividend policy based on their tax liabilities. 
In a situation where there is an increase in 
tax liabilities, the dividend payments would 
decrease, while earnings reinvestment 
increases and vice-versa. Differences 
will then be minimised by segregating 
the investors into clientele. Farrar and 
Selwyn (1967) developed a model with the 
assumption that investors capitalise on after-
tax income, where in a partial equilibrium 
framework, investors have two options: 
either they select the amount of personal and 
corporate tax leverage or accept corporate 
distributions as dividends or capital gains. 
This model argues that share repurchase is 
supposed to be considered as distribution 
of corporate earnings rather than dividend. 
Miller (1986) criticises the tax-adjusted 
model as incompatible with rational 
behaviour. He suggests that individuals 
can avoid tax liability of these payments 
by refraining from purchasing dividend-
paying shares. Alternatively, shareholders 
can purchase dividend-paying stocks and 
receive distributions while at the same time 
use borrowed finances to invest in securities 
that are tax-free. 
Market imperfection of asymmetric 
information has become the foundation 
for three different efforts in explaining 
corporate dividend policy: 1) the signaling 
model, 2) the agency cost model and 
3) the free cash flow hypothesis. The 
dividend signaling model arises from the 
lack of information asymmetries between 
managers and owners through unanticipated 
changes in dividend policy. The signaling 
theory believes that compared to any 
other alternatives, the dividend policy is 
able to communicate information about 
the existing or expected level of earnings 
(Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). They point out 
that share price reactions are not caused 
by the dividend payout itself, but by the 
information that investors understood with 
regards to the future prospects of the firm. 
A reduction in dividend is viewed as very 
bad news, as it is usually understood to arise 
after a sustained decrease in earnings, and 
it conveys the expectation of management 
of having less cash than it had in the past. 
Dividends also help investors in solving 
the asymmetric information problem of 
identifying between high-quality and low-
quality firms because high-quality firms will 
naturally be able to pay dividends.
The agency cost model assumes that 
firms pay dividends in order to solve 
the agency’s problems arising from the 
separation of corporate ownership and 
control (Megginson et, al., 2010). Dividend 
is perceived as an approach to lessen 
the agency’s costs that arise from the 
managers and owners of the firm, thus 
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offering a rationale for the distribution 
of cash resources to shareholders (Chen 
& Dhiensiri, 2009). Based on the agency 
theory, the need for monitoring managers 
increases in more dispersed ownership firms 
due to severe agency problems. However, in 
a firm that has high managerial ownership, 
agency costs are lower due to the better 
alignment of both the shareholders’ and the 
manager’s goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency problems that might arise as a result 
of information asymmetries are wealth 
transfers from bondholders to shareholders 
as well as failure to accept projects that 
have positive net present value (Barnea, 
et.al, 1981). There are two ways in which 
dividend policy influences these situations. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) highlight that 
covenants that govern claim priority are able 
to mitigate the conflict between shareholder 
and bondholder. Besides that, Easterbrook 
(1984) suggests that the reduction of 
agency costs between shareholders and 
managers is the reason why firms pay 
dividends. If the firm pays dividends, they 
can opt to raise money through the capital 
market. However, they will be subject 
to the scrutiny and disciplining effect of 
investment professionals. In exchange for 
the increased monitoring, shareholders 
are willing to accept higher personal taxes 
associated with dividends. 
The free cash flow hypothesis combines 
market information asymmetrics and 
the agency theory (Jensen, 1986). The 
inefficient utilisation of funds in excess 
of profitable investment avenues by the 
management was first identified by Berle 
and Means (1932). Managers whose goal 
is to maximise shareholders’ wealth should 
invest in all profitable opportunities. The 
free cash flow hypothesis suggests that 
paying high dividends is one of the ways to 
hinder managers from investing in projects 
below cost of capital or wasting the cash 
on organisation inefficiencies with respect 
to firms that have growth opportunities 
and higher free cash flow. After financing 
all positive net present value projects, the 
remaining funds can bring conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders 
(Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). Therefore, 
debt interest payments and dividend 
payments will reduce the amount of free 
cash flow available to managers to invest in 
marginal net present value projects as well 
as consumptions that benefit the manager. 
Frankfurter and Wood (2002) conclude that 
comparing either one of the theories (market 
information asymmetric and agency theory) 
with better explains dividend policy rather 
than explaining dividend policy from an 
understanding of both theories combined.
Determinants of Dividend Policy
From the literature review, many factors 
may be identified as the determinants of 
dividend policy. This study, however, will 
focus on a few selected factors, which are 
profitability, liquidity, lagged dividend, 
growth opportunities and leverage.
Profitability
Lintner (1956) takes the qualitative approach 
in his study by conducting interviews with 
personnel of large firms in the United States 
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of America to address corporate dividend 
behaviour. Throughout the interviews, he 
found that the main determinants of dividend 
changes were the most recent earnings and 
past dividend paid. Management is more 
concerned with the change in rather than 
the amount of dividend and it tries to 
maintain a consistent level of dividend. 
Furthermore, there was a tendency to move 
towards some target payout ratio; however, 
the speed of adjustment varies among 
companies. Fama and Babiak (1968) used 
statistical techniques of regression analysis, 
simulations and prediction tests to study 
the determinants of dividend payments by 
individual firms during the period from 1946 
to 1964. They conclude that net income 
provides a better measure of dividend 
compared to either cash flow or net income 
and depreciation incorporated as separate 
variables in the model. 
This is further supported by Pruitt and 
Gitman (1991) who also take a qualitative 
approach by interviewing the financial 
managers of a thousand of the largest US 
companies and found that vital factors 
that influence dividend payments are 
current and past-year profits. They also add 
that firms with relatively stable earnings 
are more likely to distribute a higher 
percentage of their earnings as dividend 
compared to firms with fluctuating earnings. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (2001), 
who study the characteristics of dividend 
paying companies, found that firm size, 
profitability and investment opportunities 
affect the decision to pay dividends. Larger 
firms that are more profitable are expected 
to pay dividends. However, firms with more 
investment opportunities are less expected 
to pay dividends. 
Pandey (2003) in his study of corporate 
dividend policy and behaviour in Malaysia 
finds that payout ratios vary from industry 
to industry. Based on the results of 
multinominal logit analysis, it can be seen 
that the dividends of companies listed in 
KLSE are sensitive to changes in earnings. 
From a slightly different view, Baker et al. 
(1985) conclude that the levels of future 
earnings and past dividend patterns are the 
major determinants of dividend payments 
in their study of 318 New York Stock 
Exchange firms. This is further supported 
by Baker and Powell (2000). Based on 
their survey of NYSE listed firms, they find 
that determinants of dividends differ from 
industry to industry. Anticipated levels of 
future earnings are the main determinant of 
dividend policy. Moreover, in studying the 
dividend policy and payout ratio based on 
evidence collected from the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, Al-Twaijry (2007) finds 
that there is no significant correlation 
between earnings and payout ratio, which 
is in line to past results of most Malaysian 
companies, where the link between the 
companies’ dividend policies and the 
companies’ income for the year is not clear.
Liquidity
Brittain (1966) suggests that the more 
suitable measure of a company’s capability 
to pay dividends is cash flow. Cash flow 
is derived from profit after tax plus 
depreciation expenses of the financial 
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year. He argues that dividend payment is 
considered a charge before depreciation and 
thus, should be related to earnings. Besides 
that, due to the changes in regulations and 
accounting practices related to depreciation 
allowance, net current earnings would fail 
to mirror the movement of true earnings, 
which is the ultimate basis of the ability 
to pay dividends. This is further supported 
by Alli et al. (1993), who disclose that 
dividend payments depend more on cash 
flow which reflect the firm’s ability to pay 
dividends rather than on current earnings. 
This is because current earnings are more 
heavily influenced by accounting practices. 
Thus, current earnings do not really reflect 
the firm’s ability to pay dividends. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) suggests 
that conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers over payout policy is severe 
when the firm generates considerable free 
cash flow, in which situation the free cash 
flow hypothesis concludes that a firm should 
pay higher dividends if growth opportunities 
are fewer and free cash flow is higher in 
order to prevent managers from investing 
the cash at below cost of capital or wasting 
it on organisational inefficiencies. Thus, it is 
expected that there be a positive relationship 
between free cash flow and dividend payout. 
Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) analyse 
the determinants of the corporate dividend 
policy using a sample of firms listed 
in the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
using 11 independent variables, each 
representing the various dividend theories, 
which are signaling theory, agency theory, 
residual theory, dividend stability theory 
and imputation system. Ordinary least 
squares regression was adopted to test 
the relationship and the findings strongly 
support the agency theory, where the higher 
the management share holding, the lower 
the dividend payout ratio. Besides that, the 
more dispersive the ownership structure, 
the higher the dividend payout ratio. They 
also find a significant positive relationship 
between the level of free cash flow and 
dividend payout ratio in their truncated 
sample. However, their full sample shows 
that there is a positive but insignificant 
relationship between the level of free cash 
flow and dividend payout ratio. 
In addition, Mahapatra and Biswasroy 
(2002) study the influence of profit after 
tax and cash flow on the dividend policy 
of 59 Indian sample companies from four 
industries for a period of 12 years and find 
that dividend policy is mostly influenced 
by cash flow, where as profit after tax was 
found to be a less significant determinant. 
Furthermore, Anil and Kapoor (2008) 
examine the determinants of dividend 
payout ratios of the Indian Information 
Technology Sector. The sample selected 
for this study come from companies under 
the CNX IT, which have more than 50 % of 
their turnover contributed from IT-related 
activities such as software development, 
hardware manufacture, vending, support 
and maintenance. Data collectd over seven 
years (2000–2006) were then tested using 
a multiple linear regression technique. The 
results show a positive but insignificant 
relationship between profitability and 
dividend payout ratio. However, there is a 
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positive and significant relationship between 
cash flow and dividend payout ratio. On 
the other hand, corporate taxes, sales 
growth and market-to-book value show 
an insignificant relationship and thus, it is 
concluded that these are not the important 
factors that influence the dividend payout 
ratio of the Indian IT sector. 
 In contrast, Simon (1994) studies 
the determinants of dividend payments 
by US firms from the year 1984 to 1985 
by re-evaluating Lintner’s data with new 
independent variables related to cash 
flows. Though his results support Lintner’s 
view that changes in per share dividends 
are related to earnings and the previous 
year’s dividend payout, he finds that there 
is no relationship between cash flows and 
dividend policy. More firms that have 
a large portion of idle cash are likely to 
return part of the cash to their investors. 
When the amount of idle cash available 
to management is reduced, the ability of 
management to use that idle cash for their 
own interests rather than the interests of 
management will therefore be reduced. 
However, this effect might not be clear with 
regards to financial institutions as financial 
institutions have a wide range of short-term 
investment vehicles in which to place their 
idle funds. Yiedom and Agyei (2011), who 
conducted a study on the determinants of 
dividend policy of banks in Ghana by the 
use of panel methodology with random 
effects model, found that liquidity has a 
negative but insignificant relationship with 
dividend payout, and they highlight that this 
is probably due to the wide array short-term 
investment vehicles available to financial 
institutions. 
Lagged Dividend
Baker et al. (1985) and Farelly et al. (1986) 
survey 562 New York Stock Exchange 
firms and based on their analysis, they 
conclude that the major determinants 
of dividend payments are the pattern of 
past dividends and the expected future 
earnings. Furthermore, the results also 
show that managers are concerned with 
dividend stability and believe that dividend 
policy affects share value. In addition, 
Pal and Goyal (2007) study the leading 
determinants of the dividend policy of 
the Indian banking industry by applying 
various statistical models which include the 
Backward Elimination regression model, the 
Granger Causality Model and the Lintner 
Model. They eventually show some concrete 
results related to dividend decisions in the 
Indian banking industry, where the industry 
follows a stable dividend policy as lagged 
dividend that emerges as the significant 
factor. In addition, Yiadom and Agyei (2011) 
find that a change in dividend is one of the 
statistically significant factors that positively 
influences the dividend policy of banks in 
Ghana. In addition, Isa (1992) concludes 
in his study that firms in Malaysia follow 
stable dividend policies. In contrast, Darling 
(1957) argues that lagged dividend has no 
direct influence on the decision-making 
on dividends. This is because the weight 
assigned to it in the regression equation is 
a reflection of some other variables that co-
vary with the lagged dividends and thus, the 
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function based on lagged dividend is only 
useful for the short-run prediction. However, 
he suggests that lagged profit would offer a 
better explanation of the current dividend 
level. 
Growth Opportunities
Dhemeja (1976) tests the dividend 
behaviour of  Indian companies by 
classifying them into size group, industry 
group, growth group and control group and 
finds that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between dividend payout of one 
industry and size of another. Furthermore, 
growth is negatively related to dividend 
payout and is found to be significant. In 
addition, Rozeff (1982) argues that if past or 
anticipated future growth is rapid, managers 
tend to conserve funds for reinvestment 
purposes and thus, a lower payout ratio is 
established. This is further supported by 
a study conducted by Chen and Dhiensiri 
(2009) in their study using evidence from 
New Zealand. Krishnamoorthy and Sastry 
(1971) study the dividend behavior of the 
chemical industry for the period between 
1962 and 1967 using Lintner’s model 
with additional explanatory variables such 
as investment expenditure and external 
finance. The study shows that investment 
activity influences the dividend policy of 
the firms, implying higher savings when 
the investment climate is positive. This is 
further supported by Yiadom and Agyei 
(20011), who find that growth influences 
a bank’s dividend policy negatively and 
significantly. 
Smith (1963) studies the factors 
influencing corporate savings decisions of 
firms. These factors have been classified into 
two broad categories; the first factor is the 
investment decision and the second factor 
arises from dividend stability. He finds that 
income and lagged dividend play a vital 
role in corporate savings in the short run but 
demand for investment fund has a smaller 
role in deciding the behaviour of corporate 
savings. However, in the long run, demand 
for investment funds plays an important role 
in estimating corporate savings. This study 
shows slightly different views in terms of 
the short-run and long-run effect of growth 
towards making a dividend decision.
There are studies that show that 
the dividend decision is independent of 
investment policy. For example, Pruitt 
and Gitman’s survey (1991) based 
on 114 responses finds that managers 
make dividend decisions independent of 
investment and financing decisions. They 
find that the major influences on current 
dividends are profits and lagged dividend. 
In addition, Al-Twaijry (2007) also finds 
that in the case of companies listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange , the payout 
ratio and the company’s future growth are 
negatively correlated, albeit insignificantly. 
Furthermore, Ahmed and Javid (2009) 
find that growth and leverage are not the 
determinants of dividend policies in listed 
firms of the Karachi Stock Exchange. In 
addition, Naceur et.al (2006), who conducts 
a study on the re-examination of dividend 
policy in a dynamic panel data analysis, 
finds that growth has negative insignificant 
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relationship with the dividend payout of 
financial institutions in Tunisia. 
Leverage
Financial institutions are typically leveraged 
and their debt contracts (deposits) are 
generally standardised, resulting in little 
chance for the imposition of indentures and 
specific covenants. In banks, particularly, 
deposits are highly demandable and 
depositors can withdraw their funds from the 
bank as a way of disciplining bank managers 
from expropriation and taking excessive 
risk. In addition, excessive risk taking is 
sometimes punished with higher required 
interest rates and slower deposit growth. 
Hence, it is understandable that banks 
use dividends for the purpose of signaling 
quality of their assets to debt holders and 
depositors. However, this can be very costly 
due to the regulation of capital adequacy 
requirements (Forti & Schiozer, 2011). 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1964), Mahapatra 
and Sahu (1993) and Mahapatra and Panda 
(1995) have identified debt equity ratio 
(represented by capital structure/financial 
leverage) as another factor that has strong 
impact on a firm’s dividend behaviour. A 
firm often demands external finances if 
there is a constraint on its internal resources, 
which are generated by net profits after tax 
and dividends. Thus, the higher the dividend, 
the higher the demand for borrowing. On the 
other hand, lower dividends will bring about 
a lower debt equity ratio due to less demand 
for borrowing. This is also supported by 
Aivazian and Booth (2003), where they find 
that US firms and emerging market firms 
which have higher debt ratios will have 
lower dividend payments. 
Al-Kuwairi (2009) confirms that the 
dividend policy is inversely related to 
the leverage ratio. Nonetheless, in their 
study of the determinants of the dividend 
policy for banks in Ghana, Yiadom and 
Agyei (2011) find that the use of debt 
has been associated with lower agency 
cost and enhanced firm profitability, 
both of which have the tendency of 
improving dividend payments. However, 
a study conducted by Abor and Bokpin 
(2010) on investment opportunities, 
corporate finance and dividend payout 
policy contradicts this opinion. They 
investigate the effects of investment 
opportunities and corporate finance on 
dividend policy with a sample of 34 
emerging market countries covering a 
17-year period using the fixed effects 
panel model. Although the results exhibit 
a positive relationship between financial 
leverage and dividend payouts, this 
relationship, however, is not significant. 
Ajmi and Hussain (2011), in examining 
corporate dividend decisions of Saudi 
Arabian firms, find that current profit, 
lagged dividends and life cycles are 
positive statistically and significant . 
However, leverage is found to be not 
an important determinant of dividend 
payments and this is explained by the 
fact that Saudi firms are generally low-
geared. Furthermore, Juhmani (2009) 
studies the determinants of dividend 
payout policy of 35 Bahraini firms. His 
results show that profitability has the 
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greatest effect on the current-year cash 
dividends change, followed by previous-
year dividends and lastly, by size of 
Bahraini companies. On the other hand, 
financial leverage does not influence the 
change in cash dividends. This is further 
supported by a study on the determinants 
of dividend policy in Pakistan conducted 
by Ahmed and Javid (2009).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines the determinants of 
dividend policy of financial institutions in 
Malaysia. Samples of firms that are listed in 
the Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2001 to 
2010 are considered. However, based on the 
availability of data in the DataStream and 
annual reports of each financial institution, 
out of 36 financial institutions listed in Bursa 
Malaysia, 33 were selected for this study. 
This includes financial institutions offering 
banking and financial services, investment 
banking and brokerage as well as insurance 
and reinsurance. The rationale for this is that 
all these financial institutions have common 
factors of being highly leveraged and highly 
regulated and act as financial intermediaries 
in the financial markets. This study includes 
both financial firms that pay dividends and 
those that do not so as to avoid selection bias 
(Kim & Mandala, 1992; Deshmukh, 2003). 
The dependent variable in this study is 
Dividend Payout, which is measured by the 
dividend payout ratio while the independent 
variables are profitability, liquidity, lagged 
dividend, growth and leverage. Table 1 
below provides a summary of the variables 
used.
The correlation coefficient measures the 
degree to which two variables are associated 
with each other. It can take any value 
between -1 and +1. A value of -1 means 
that the variables move in the opposite 
direction while a value of +1 means the 
variables move in the same direction. This 
test is conducted to determine the presence 
of multi-collinearity among the regressors. 
The model in this study is tested for a 
stationary series using the panel unit root 
test in order to ensure that an inconsistent 
and spurious relationship is not analysed. 
A series will not be stationary if it shows 
a stochastic trend, or even simply wanders 
around randomly, and thus it cannot be 
forecast in the future. Regardless of the 
starting point, a stationary series will 
constantly return to a given value and is 
also expected to attain that value in the 
long run (Hall, 1994). Two Panel Unit Root 
Tests were considered in this study, which 
are Levin et al. (2002) (LLC hereafter) and 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS hereafter). 
LLC a l lows  fo r  he te rogene i ty 
of individual deterministic effects and 
heterogeneous serial correlation structure 
of  the error  terms,  which assumes 
homogeneous first order autoregressive 
parameters. The pooled t-statistic of the 
estimator is developed in order to evaluate 
the null hypothesis that each individual 
time series contains a unit root against the 
alternative hypothesis that each time series 
is stationary. The procedure imposes a 
higher power than the separate unit root test 
for each individual due to the imposition of 
a cross-equation restriction on the first-order 
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Dependent Dividend Policy Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR)
The ratio of dividends paid out of the total earnings. It is calculated 
as:
(Dividend/Earnings) or (DPS/EPS)
This variable is used in the study of determinants of dividend policy 
of banks in Ghana that was conducted by Yiadom and Agyei (2011) 
and is proved to be a significant determinant of dividend policy. 
Independent Profitability Return on Assets (ROA)
Since the financial institutions chosen for this study differ in size, a 
comparison based on absolute amount (i.e. net income) will not yield 
reliable results. Return on Assets is used as a proxy for profitability. 
It is calculated as: Net Income/Total assets 
Liquidity Cash Flow (LIQ)
As found by Brittain (1966) in his study, the more appropriate 
measure of a company’s ability to pay dividends is cash flow. The 
formula is as follows:
Cash and cash equivalent/Net total assets
Lagged Dividend Do (LAGDIV)
This refers to the cash dividend paid a year before the year under 
study. A company that follows a stable dividend policy, past dividend 
trend influences the current dividend payment. Most of the previous 
studies have taken this variable into account as a vital factor that 
determines dividend policy. 
Leverage Total Debt to Total Asset (LEV)
This variable was used by Ajmi and Hussain (2011) in their study 
of corporate dividend decisions: Evidence from Saudi Arabia. It is 
calculated as: Total Debt/Total Asset
Growth 
Opportunities
Asset Growth Rate (GROWTH)
Asset growth rate measures the average of expansion or contraction 
of a company. Generally, when growth is high, the distribution of 
dividends will be low because the company will retain most of its 
earnings to finance its investments. It is calculated as: 
(Total Asset ¹- Total Asset º) / Total Asset º
This proxy is used by Forti & Schiozer (2011) in their study of 
informed depositors and bank dividends, a case of Brazilian banks, 
and Naceur et al. (2006) in the re-examination of the dividend policy 
of Tunisian firms. 
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partial autocorrelation coefficients under the 




it it it jj
y y yα β− −=∆ = +∑
it itX  δ ε′+ +             (1)
where, H0: α = 0 (there is unit root) and 
H1: α < 0 (no unit root).
Levin et al. (2002) noted that their 
panel based unit root tests are more relevant 
for panels of moderate size (i.e., 10 < N < 
250 and 25 <T < 250). However, the major 
limitation of LLC is that the autoregressive 
parameters are considered identical across 
the panel. This limitation has therefore 
been overcome by IPS, which proposes a 
panel unit root test without the assumption 
of identical first order correlation under the 
alternative. They suggested a more flexible 
and computationally simple unit root testing 
procedure for panels which allows for a 
simultaneous stationary and non-stationary 
series. IPS tests use the same model as 
the LLC except that its H0: αi = 0 for all i 
(existence of unit root) and H1: αi = 0 for i 
= 1, 2, …, N1 or αi < 0 for i = N+1, N+2,…, 
N (no unit root).
The cross-sectional character of the data 
allows the use of panel data methodology. 
Panel data involves the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of units over 
several time periods and provides results 
that are simply not detectable in pure cross-
sections or pure time-series studies. Instead 
of only looking at the temporal behaviour 
of each company, the determination of 
temporal evolution of groups of companies 
is possible with the panel data technique. 
This technique takes into consideration 
the individual heterogeneity, which allows 
a larger number of data points, hence 
improving the efficiency of the estimates. 
Thus, the panel regression equation differs 
from a regular time series or cross-section 
regression by the double subscript attached 
to each variable. The general form of the 
panel data model can be specified as:
,it i i t itY Xα β ε= + +               (2)
Where the subscript i denotes the 
cross-sectional dimension and t represents 
the time-series dimension. In this equation, 
Yit represents the dependent variable in the 
model,  which is Dividend Payout Ratio 
(DPR). Xit, on the other hand contains the 
set of explanatory variables in the estimation 
model. α is the constant and β represents the 
coefficients.
In addition, the following model 
was used for this study to explain the 
relationships between dividend payout ratios 
and the determinants:
0 1 , 2 ,it i t i tDPR PROF LIQβ β β= + +
3 , 4 ,i t i tLAGDIV GROWTHβ β+ +
5 , ,i t i tLEVβ ε+ +             (3)
where:
DPRit = Dividend per share / earnings per 
share for firm i in period of t,
PROFit = Net income / total assets for firm 
i in period t,
LAGDIVit = Previous year divident for firm 
i in period t,
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GROWTHit = Asset growth rate for firm i 
in period t,
LEVit = Total debt / total asset for firm i in 
period t,
εit = Error term for firm i in period t
Panel data may have group effects, 
time effects or both, and these effects could 
either be fixed effects or random effects. A 
fixed effect model assumes differences in 
intercepts across groups or time periods, 
whereas a random effect model explores 
differences in error variances. In order to 
come to a decision on whether the fixed 
effects model or the random effects model 
should be adopted, the Hausman (1978) 
specification test is employed. The Hausman 
specification test compares the fixed versus 
random effects under the null hypothesis 
that the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other regressors in the model. If 
correlated (H0 is rejected at 5 % significant 
level, where P-value<0.05), a random 
effect model produces biased estimators, 
which violates one of the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions, thus a fixed effect model is 
preferred.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This research analyses the effect of 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, lagged 
dividend and growth towards the dividend 
policy of Malaysian financial institutions. 
Correlation Analysis
In determining whether the coefficient 
estimates may vary erratically with respect 
to minimal changes in the model or the data, 
the correlation coefficients of the variables 
are shown in Table 2. Dividend payout 
ratio shows positive correlation with return 
on assets, liquidity and lagged dividend, 
but negative correlation with growth and 
leverage. On the other hand, return on assets 
exhibits positive correlation with liquidity, 
lagged dividend and growth, but negative 
correlation with leverage. Next, liquidity has 
positive correlation with lagged dividend 
but negative correlation with growth and 
leverage. Lastly, growth depicts negative 
correlation with leverage. The results 
above also depict that the presence of 
multi-collinearity among the regressors is 
minimal, indicating that multi-collinearity 
is not a problem in the regression model.
TABLE 2 








Dividend Payout Ratio 1
Return on Assets 0.1483 1
Liquidity 0.1609 0.0776 1
Lagged Dividend 0.4632 0.2197 0.0636 1
Growth -0.0149 0.2386 -0.0799 0.0324 1
Leverage -0.2739 -0.1285 -0.1135 -0.2518 -0.0067 1
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Panel Unit Root Test
Prior to testing for panel regression, the data 
are tested for stationarity. This is conducted 
in order to be sure that the researcher is 
not analysing an inconsistent and spurious 
relationship. Two panel unit root tests are 
employed in this study, which are the Levin, 
Lin & Chu (LLC) and also the Im, Pesaran & 
Shin (IPS). The results of the panel unit root 
tests for the chosen variables, both in level 
and first difference, are reported in Table 3. 
In addition, the null hypothesis H0: assumes 
a common unit root process. As shown in 
Table 3, both LLC and IPS tests show that 
dividend payout ratio, return on assets, 
liquidity, growth and leverage for Malaysian 
financial institutions are stationary at level 
I(0). However, lagged dividend is stationary 
in its first difference I(1).
Panel Regression
Table 4 shows the results of panel regression. 
In order to determine whether the fixed 
effects model or random effect model works 
for the panel regression, the Hausman 
(1978) specification test is employed. This 
test is under the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the stochastic error 
term and explanatory variables is null and 
thus, the random effects model is more 
TABLE 3 
Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variables
LLC Test IPS Test
Level First Difference Level First Difference























** denotes significant at 1% confidence level.
Numbers in parenthesis are p-value.
The null hypothesis of LLC test and IPS test is that all of the series in the panel must contain unit roots. 
The alternative hypothesis of LLC test is that all of the series in the panel are stationary, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis of IPS test is that at least one of the series in the panel is stationary. 
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suitable compared to the fixed effects model. 
The results of the regression are shown in 
Table 4, together with the results of the 
Hausman specification test. The Hausman 
specification test rejects the null hypothesis 
at 1 % significant level, thus denoting that 
the fixed effect model is better than the 
random fixed effect model. Hence, this study 
captures the determinants of dividend policy 
via the fixed effect model. 
TABLE 4 
Panel Data Methodology: Fixed-effect Model
















Number of Observations 306
Hausman Test Prob = 0.0001
Notes:
** denotes significant at 1% confidence level
The regression results indicate that 
profitability, as measured by return on 
assets, has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with the dividend payout. This 
signals the fact that the financial institution’s 
profitability is viewed as a vital factor 
in influencing the dividend payments. 
The positive relationship indicates that 
as the financial institution becomes more 
profitable, it is more likely to declare 
high dividends. Over time, profitable 
Malaysian financial institutions are capable 
of accumulating sufficient earnings, 
enabling them to distribute higher dividend 
payments to their shareholders. This finding 
is consistent with prior empirical studies 
(Lintner, 1956; Fama & Babiak, 1968; Pruitt 
& Gitman, 1991; Fama & French, 2001; 
Abor & Bokpin, 2010; Yiadom & Agyei, 
2011).
However, the results show that liquidity, 
as measured by ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, has a positive 
effect on dividend payouts but the result is 
insignificant. This implies that Malaysian 
financial institutions that have ample 
liquidity are more likely to distribute higher 
dividends to shareholders, compared with 
those that have less liquidity. This conforms 
to the free cash flow hypothesis. However, 
the insignificant relationship between these 
two variables might be due to the fact 
that compared with companies in other 
industries, financial institutions have ample 
short-term investment opportunities. Thus, 
although they may have high liquidity, 
they will also take into consideration their 
short-term investment opportunities. This 
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is consistent with past studies conducted by 
Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) and Yiedom and 
Agyei (2011).
Lagged dividends have a significant 
positive relationship with the dividend 
payout of Malaysian financial institutions. 
This shows that financial institutions in 
Malaysia follow a stable dividend policy, 
where regularity of dividend payments 
is maintained, resulting to only a gradual 
adjustment of dividend payments towards 
a target payout ratio. This result supports 
the signaling theory, where most firms are 
reluctant to decrease dividend payments 
as it is normally viewed as terrible news 
indicating that the management might 
encounter reduction in its cash level. This 
result is also consistent with the findings of 
past studies (Baker et al., 2004; Farelly et 
al., 1986; Pal & Goyal, 2007; Yiedom & 
Agyei, 2011).
Growth, which is measured by the 
changes in assets, shows a negative influence 
on dividend policy. This indicates that 
when past or anticipated future growth 
is rapid, managers tend to conserve 
funds for reinvestment purposes, hence 
establishing a lower payout ratio. Managers’ 
reluctance to be short of funds and to rely 
on costly financing to protect against under-
investment is one of the possible reasons 
for this. Moreover, the retained earnings 
will increase their capacity in relation 
to profitable investment opportunities. 
However, the relationship is insignificant. 
This may be due to the financial institutions 
making dividend decisions independently of 
investment policy. This result is consistent 
with earlier empirical evidence (Pruitt & 
Gitman, 1991; Al-Twaijry, 2007; Ahmed & 
Javid, 2009).
Lastly, there is a significant positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend 
payouts of Malaysian financial institutions. 
This indicates that a riskier financial 
institution pays out lower dividends in order 
to lessen its reliance on external financing. 
This is similar to the findings recorded 
in finance-related literature (Dhrymes & 
Kurz, 1964; Mahapatra & Sahu, 1993; 
Mahapatra & Pandi, 1995; Aivazian & 
Booth, 2003; Yiedom & Agyei, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the R² of 0.1602 shows that 
16.02 % of the variation in the dividend 
policy can be explained by the independent 
variables, namely, profitability, liquidity, 
lagged dividend, growth opportunities 
and leverage, whereas the balance of the 
variation is explained by other internal or 
external forces or other variables. 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study is conducted to identify the 
determinants of the dividend policy of 
Malaysian financial institutions. The panel 
dataset is constructed from 33 financial 
institutions in Malaysia over a period of 10 
years (2001-2010). Due to the advantages of 
panel data analysis this study employs panel 
data analysis. In order to test the relationship 
between dividend policy and the chosen set 
of explanatory variables, the fixed effect 
model is used based on the result of the 
Hausman specification test. 
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The results show a statist ically 
significant positive relationship between 
dividend policy and profitability, which 
implies that Malaysian financial institutions 
distribute higher dividends when they 
record higher profitability, despite the 
regulations that they need to follow before 
declaration of dividends, outlined in the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
1989 and Insurance Act 1996. Similarly, 
liquidity shows a positive association with 
dividend policy, which means that the 
financial institutions with ample liquidity 
will likely distribute higher dividends. 
However, this association is not significant 
as shown by the analysis. Lagged dividends 
also show a positive significant relationship 
with dividend policy, which implies that 
financial institutions in Malaysia follow 
a stable dividend policy that maintains 
regularity of dividend payments with 
gradual adjustments of dividend payments 
towards target payout. However, the results 
find that growth opportunity has a negative 
association with dividend policy. This attests 
that financial institutions in Malaysia with 
higher growth opportunities will likely 
retain their earnings in order to finance 
their growth. This association, however, 
is not significant in the case of Malaysian 
financial institutions. Finally, leverage 
shows a significant negative relationship 
with dividend policy, which means that a 
riskier financial institution pays out lower 
dividends.
In conclusion, profitability, lagged 
dividend and leverage are found to be the 
major determinants of dividend policy in 
relation to Malaysian financial institutions. 
The results support the agency cost theory, 
signaling theory and the free cash flow 
hypothesis. This study only focuses on five 
independent variables that aim to explain 
the determinants of dividend policy in the 
Malaysian financial industry. As a result, 
the variables chosen can only explain 
16.02 % of the variation in the dividend 
policy. However, based on the literature, 
there are other factors that can influence 
dividend policy such as size of firms and 
ownership structure, among others. Thus, it 
is recommended that more variables should 
be added in future studies in order to better 
analyse the determinants of dividend policy 
for more robust results.
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